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methods to take advantage of the sudden imposition of an enrollment cap, comparing the labor 
supply of enrollees to eligible applicants on a waitlist. We find that enrollment into public 
insurance leads to sizable and statistically meaningful reductions in employment up to at least 
nine quarters later, with an estimated size of 2–10 percentage points, depending on the model 
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Medicaid is currently the third largest federal domestic spending item after Medicare and 
Social Security and the second largest state spending item after education. Nearly 60 million 
low-income adults and children benefit from the program and up to 21.3 million additional low-
income adults could eventually gain coverage under Medicaid expansions associated with the 
2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA; Stephens et al. 2013).1 Given the large and growing population 
served by the program, knowing how Medicaid and other public health insurance programs 
affect the labor supply of recipients and their family members has become increasingly important 
for understanding the total costs of the program.  
Economic theory predicts that cash and in-kind transfer programs generally should 
reduce labor supply, and extensive empirical research typically has shown that most such 
programs do indeed have the hypothesized effect. However, the literature on Medicaid’s effect 
on the labor supply of low-income parents is mixed. While initial work finds strong work 
disincentives (Ellwood and Adams 1990; Moffitt and Wolfe 1992), later papers find weaker or 
even positive effects (Yelowitz 1995; Montgomery and Navin 2000; Ham and Shore-Sheppard 
2001, 2005; Hamersma and Kim 2009; Hamersma 2010; Strumpf 2011). The inconclusive nature 
of the existing literature suggests that effects are heterogeneous across populations and time 
periods studied. 
We contribute to this literature by providing plausibly causal estimates of the effect of 
means-tested public insurance coverage on the employment of nonelderly, nondisabled adults 
without dependent children (childless adults). Researchers have largely been unable to explore 
the effects of Medicaid eligibility on the labor supply of childless adults, as states have only 
recently begun extending coverage to this population. A recent paper by Garthwaite et al. (2013) 
1 Approximately half these projected new adults live in states where, as of March 5, 2013, governors either 
had not yet decided to expand on or oppose the Medicaid expansion (Kaiser Family Foundation 2013). 
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examines eligibility contractions in Tennesse’s program (TennCare), which had been available to 
childless adults until July 2005, and found both large reductions in Medicaid coverage and large 
increases in employment rates among childless adults in Tennessee following this contraction.  
These results are consistent with a 60 percentage point reduction in labor supply stemming from 
the availability of public insurance.  Baicker et al. (2013) examined the impacts of Medicaid on 
the employment of recipients through the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment and found 
modest labor supply effects, of 1.6 percentage points, that are not statistically different from 
zero.   
Learning about the likely labor market effects of the ACA on low-income childless adults 
is of critical policy importance. Initial Congressional Budget Office projections suggested that 
the version of the legislation signed into law would have increased coverage by 33 million 
people by 2019, with Medicaid accounting for about half these gains and low-income childless 
adults comprising the majority of the Medicaid expansion population (Congressional Budget 
Office 2012a). While the subsequent Supreme Court decision making the ACA-related Medicaid 
expansion a state option will certainly reduce the magnitude of the coverage increases, it remains 
the case that childless adults are projected to gain large-scale eligibility for Medicaid in 2014 
(Congressional Budget Office 2012b).  
In this study, we exploit a recent policy reversal in Wisconsin, during which a major 
public insurance expansion for adults without dependent children (childless adults) was 
implemented and, several months later, abruptly frozen. Individuals who applied after the 
program was frozen were placed on a waitlist. Those on the waitlist would only be allowed to 
enroll in the program once enrollment dropped below the capped level, which did not occur at 
any time during our study period. We obtain estimates of the causal effect of Medicaid on the 
2 
labor supply of childless adults by comparing the labor market outcomes of those who applied 
prior to the program freeze and received benefits to those who applied after the program freeze 
and did not receive benefits. 
We use two complementary empirical strategies. First, we use a regression discontinuity 
design that employs the timing of the enrollment suspension and waitlist introduction. Second, 
we use a propensity score matching difference-in-differences approach that matches plan 
enrollees with waitlisted applicants on their observable characteristics. While the regression 
discontinuity design likely has stronger internal validity, the propensity score matching 
difference-in-differences approach allows us to take advantage of a greater amount of our data. 
A particular strength of our study is that we rely on the state’s own administrative records 
rather than on self-reported enrollment, employment, and earnings data. The data for our study 
are Medicaid enrollment files merged with quarterly unemployment insurance earnings reports 
from Wisconsin. The Medicaid records allow us to observe all enrolled and waitlisted applicants, 
including their exact date of application. The unemployment insurance earnings records are from 
employer reporting to the state and allow us to observe quarterly wages from all employers, 
changes in employer, and any spells of non-employment lasting more than one quarter. We 
merge the two administrative data sets using Social Security numbers.  
We find that public insurance enrollment reduces the likelihood that an adult in our 
sample will be employed by 2.4 to 5.9 percentage points in the difference-in-difference models 
and by 6.1 to 10.6 percentage points in the regression discontinuity models. These effect sizes 
are similar to magnitudes found in the current literature on the labor supply effects of other types 
of health insurance programs, and the sign is consistent with both the theoretical and empirical 
literatures on the effects of cash and transfer programs on labor supply. 
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PROGRAM BACKGROUND 
Launched in January 2009, Wisconsin’s BadgerCare Plus Core Plan provides health 
insurance to childless adults with household incomes below 200 percent of the Federal Poverty 
Line (FPL). The state of Wisconsin applied for and received a federal 1115 waiver to extend 
some health benefits to this population. Once enrolled, members receive a managed care benefit 
package and face little cost sharing. With few exceptions, coverage is not available to persons 
who already have any form of private health insurance, quit their job, or voluntarily dropped any 
health insurance in the 12 months prior to application. The program initially required a $60 
application fee. Upon enrollment, members were eligible to receive benefits for a period of 12 
months, when eligibility would be reevaluated.  
Enrollment began January 1, 2009, for a limited group and opened to the public on July 
1, 2009. Application levels immediately exceeded projections and program budget, with 
enrollment reaching a high of 65,057. On October 5, 2009, then-Governor Jim Doyle announced 
at a news conference that Core Plan applications would be suspended effective October 9, 2009 
at noon. The suspension was stated by the Governor to result from unanticipated demand for the 
program and was reported in newspapers statewide.  
Subsequent eligible applications were placed on a waitlist. Waitlisted applicants were not 
required to pay the application fee and were told that they would be notified once openings in 
Core were available. The waitlist had reached 89,412 individuals by December 2010. The state 
has sought to decrease overall Core Plan enrollment to a sustainable level, and has thus not been 
enrolling waitlisted applicants as current Core Plan members leave the program. The only 
waitlisted applicants ever enrolled were a small number who were eligible for a medical waitlist 
bypass because of cancer or heart disease. The presence of a waitlist, imposed quickly based 
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only on state budget criteria and not on participant characteristics, provides a natural and ready 
comparison group for those enrolled in the Core Plan. Those on the waitlist wanted to enroll and 
were eligible, but they were not able to do so before the enrollment suspension went into effect.2  
Core Plan enrollment to date has not been opened up to waitlist applicants, and attrition 
had reduced enrollment levels to approximately 24,000 as of July 2012. Attrition can occur 
through a change in eligibility (such as an out of state move, a change in insurance status such as 
eligibility for insurance through a new job, or a change in categorical eligibility criteria), or 
failure to reenroll on the part of the beneficiary. In addition, effective July 1, 2012, nonpayment 
of newly required monthly premiums for enrollees with incomes above 133 percent FPL and a 
change in income eligibility prior to the end of the 12-month enrollment period became possible 
reasons for a change in eligibility. Wisconsin’s governor and legislature chose not to participate 
in federally incentivized Medicaid expansions under the Affordable Care Act; however, effective 
April 1, 2014, all childless adults with incomes under 100 percent of the FPL are allowed to 
enroll in the Medicaid program, and all adults with incomes over 100 percent of the FPL are 
required to transition out of the program.  
A potential complication is whether the distribution mechanism itself influences the labor 
supply decisions of affected participants. If the waitlist participants we use as a control group for 
Medicaid recipients are themselves constrained by the waitlist because, for example, they believe 
2A stop-gap program with more limited benefits, called the BadgerCare Plus Basic Plan, was promised for 
waitlisted applicants at the time of the announcement. The Basic Plan was formally announced in January 2010 and 
coverage was eventually offered to those enrolled on the waitlist effective in July 2010. The state legislature 
required the Basic Plan to be self-supporting through premiums. Participants in Basic were required to remain 
eligible for the Core Plan; this meant, among other requirements, their incomes had to remain below the 200 percent 
FPL threshold. Adverse selection has been a problem for the Basic Plan: enrollment in the program was closed on 
March 19, 2011, and enrollees saw multiple increases in required premiums over time. According to a state press 
release), these changes were made because program expenditures had outpaced revenues (Brueck, 2009). 
Enrollment in Basic reached a high of 6,013 in April 2011 (reflecting March applicants) and has steadily declined 
since. 
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they need to remain eligible for the program in order to eventually receive it, this would bias 
against us finding any effects. If true, a better allocation mechanism would perhaps be a lottery 
since nonrecipients would immediately know that they would not receive the program and would 
make their labor supply decisions accordingly. We are unable to answer this question directly. 
Most of the literature on waiting lists relates to allocation of medical care. Propper (1990, 1995) 
points out that there are costs to using waiting lists as mechanisms for medical care allocation in 
the United Kingdom and estimates these costs using contingent valuation. Johannesson, 
Johansson, and Soderqvist (1998) estimate the demand for private insurance that would reduce 
waiting times in Sweden. Globerman (1991) discusses the potential for decreases in productivity 
due to waiting times. None of these studies examine a random allocation mechanism as an 
alternative choice. Cullis, Jones, and Propper (2000) provide a general treatment of the 
theoretical and empirical literature on waiting lists for health care services.  
THEORY AND RELATED LITERATURE 
A standard static labor supply model would predict that income eligibility thresholds for 
public health insurance likely reduce the incentive to remain in or return to the workforce and, 
among workers, likely reduce the incentive to increase work hours. The negative effect on labor 
supply results from the reduced need for private coverage among recipients as well as the 
possibility that increased earnings would disqualify them from public coverage (the “Medicaid 
notch”).  
The existing economics literature portrays a mixed picture of the impact of Medicaid 
eligibility on the labor supply of low-income parents, the most comparable population available 
that has been studied. Initial work found strong work disincentives of Medicaid: Ellwood and 
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Adams (1990) and Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) find single mothers on AFDC were less likely to 
exit coverage (and become employed) if Medicaid’s value to them was high. Subsequent work 
finds effect sizes of smaller magnitude (Yelowitz 1995; Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2001) and of 
the opposite sign (Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2005). Recent papers either find mixed effects 
(Hamersma and Kim 2009) or no effect (Hamersma 2010; Strumpf 2011). The inconclusive 
nature of the existing literature suggests heterogeneous effects across populations and time 
periods studied, further motivating the need to study childless adults in isolation during recent 
years. 
The literature on other important publicly provided health insurance programs is more 
conclusive. French and Jones (2011) show that Medicare eligibility is an important determinant 
of retirement decisions. Boyle and Lahey (2010) find decreased labor supply on both the 
extensive and intensive margins for older veterans eligible for Department of Veterans Affairs 
health programs.  Dave et al. (2013) find declines in labor supply among pregnant women 
eligible for Medicaid coverage during their pregnancy. 
Other types of cash and in-kind transfer programs in the United States have been found to 
negatively affect labor supply. Moffitt (2002) reviews the extensive empirical literature. More 
recently, Jacob and Ludwig (2012) find a 6 percent decline in labor force participation and a 10 
percent decrease in earnings resulting from housing vouchers. Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012) 
find reductions in employment and hours worked among single-headed households resulting 
from the Food Stamp program. Meyer (2002) finds that the Earned Income Tax Credit 
discourages work on the extensive but not on the intensive margin; Eissa and Hoynes (2004) 
confirm the finding of extensive margin work disincentives at the family level. Social Security 
Disability Insurance has generally been found to reduce employment among older men (Bound 
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1989; Parsons 1990; Gruber and Kubik 1997; Chen and Van der Klaauw 2008; Maestas, Mullen, 
and Strand 2013; French and Song 2012). 
The effect of public insurance on earnings is ambiguous in our context. If availability of 
public insurance leads to increased job mobility and increased mobility results in better job 
matches, we could, all else equal, observe higher wages (and therefore earnings) among the 
public insurance enrollees. A second possibility is that workers could match with jobs that pay 
higher wages since the job would no longer need to pay health benefits. Baicker and Chandra 
(2006) find that increases in health insurance premiums result in both a decreased probability of 
employment and lower wages, supporting a partial wage offset for health insurance. Since we do 
not observe hours worked, only quarterly earnings, in practice earnings could either increase 
(because of better matches and/or wage offsets) or decrease (because of fewer hours worked). 
Again, since workers must remain below the income eligibility threshold the positive effects are 
likely limited. 
Finally, increased availability of public insurance may increase the likelihood that a 
worker would leave the labor force to become self-employed. Consistent with a compensating 
differential framework, the self-employment wage is effectively increased by the value of public 
insurance coverage. Results from the empirical literature are mixed (Lombard 2001; Holtz-
Eakin, Penrod, and Rosen 1996; Zissimopoulos and Karoly 2007; Fairlie, Kapur, and Gates 
2011); however, we acknowledge the possibility and discuss it further below. 
DATA 
The data sources for this project are state administrative records on enrolled and 
waitlisted Core Plan applicants and earnings records from Wisconsin’s unemployment insurance 
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(UI) system. In the state’s records on Core Plan enrollees and waitlisted applicants, we observe 
exact application date, age in months, monthly income at the time of application, county of 
residence, and sex. The UI data include quarterly earnings for each individual from each covered 
firm where he or she worked during that quarter; only employers not subject to unemployment 
insurance laws (for example, the self-employed) are exempt from the reporting requirement. We 
observe these data for each person from the first quarter of 2005 (Q1 2005) through the final 
quarter of 2011 (Q4 2011). We merge the data on Core Plan applicants and enrollees to the UI 
data using Social Security numbers.  
A particular strength of our analysis is that UI data exhibit superior accuracy over the 
survey-based data used in the existing literature. Virtually all employers are required to file 
quarterly wage reports for each employee on their payrolls. The wage reports include the 
employee’s Social Security number and quarterly wages and the employer’s federal tax 
identification number and industry classification code. Using these data, we can track quarterly 
earnings and employment at all covered firms, job changes, and any periods of non-employment 
lasting for at least one quarter.  
Waitlist members were subject to basic screening, but to ensure comparability we employ 
several sample filters to ensure those on the waitlist would have actually been eligible for Core 
had they been invited to enroll (on the basis of all characteristics other than earnings, which may 
have changed in response to being on the waitlist). First, we drop anyone not in the eligibility 
age range (ages 19–64) according to date of birth. Second, we observe termination codes 
(reasons) for waitlist members that are removed from the waitlist, and we drop all waitlist 
members with codes indicating that they either do not meet program requirements or they are 
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eligible for other Medicaid programs. We do not observe Core Plan applicants who applied 
before the program cutoff and were found ineligible by the state. 
Table 1 reports demographic characteristics. Individuals who enrolled in the Core Plan 
are aged 43 on average and 49.6 percent female, while the average age of those on the waitlist is 
lower—38 years—and 43.7 percent are female. If we examine only those who applied within 
about a month of the October 9 cutoff date (i.e., those who enrolled into Core between 
September 1, 2009, and October 2, 2009, and those who were waitlisted and applied between 
October 9, 2009, and October 31, 2009), these differences are slightly smaller.  
We consider several outcomes to measure labor supply using the quarterly employment 
records available in the UI data.  For employment, we consider average quarterly employment 
over the Q4 2009 to Q4 2011 period, with employment defined as having any earnings in a 
quarter. Earnings are defined as average earnings over Q4 2009 to Q4 2011. For the difference-
in-differences models, these outcomes are defined analogously for the pre-program period.  
Finally, in order to assess the potential for our results to be explained by transitions to 
self-employment, which would not be recorded in our administrative data, we use the American 
Community Survey (ACS) from 2009 to 2011.We chose the ACS for its relatively large state 
sample sizes. The ACS includes a question asking participants whether they were employed by a 
government, private company, nonprofit organization, or were self-employed. We classify all 
respondents who indicated that they were self-employed (whether at an incorporated or 
unincorporated business) as self-employed.  
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EMPIRICAL METHOD 
We identify the effect of the Core Plan on the labor supply of childless adults using two 
complementary sets of analyses, each with its own relative strengths. The first is regression 
discontinuity (Lee and Lemieux 2010) and the second is propensity score difference-in-
differences (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997). Each empirical strategy relies on a slightly 
different assumption about the comparability of the waitlist applicants versus the enrolled 
applicants. If there were no differences between waitlist applicants and enrolled applicants, both 
approaches would be equally valid. While the regression discontinuity design likely exhibits 
superior internal validity relative to matching methods, the latter design is relatively better 
powered. We think the ability to assess the robustness of the results across these two methods 
provides more convincing evidence than implementing either approach on its own.  
We first use a regression discontinuity (RD) design. Lee and Lemieux (2010) provide an 
overview and summary of recent applications. In essence, this approach involves comparing the 
labor supply of those who applied just prior to October 9, 2009 (immediately before the 
enrollment cap was implemented) with the labor supply of those who applied just after October 
9, 2009 (immediately after the enrollment cap was set). As discussed above, eligible applicants 
who applied prior to October 9 were enrolled in the program while those who applied after 
October 9 were placed on a waiting list. Because all eligible people who applied before October 
9 were allowed to enroll in the Core Plan and none who applied after were, we use a “sharp” 
regression discontinuity design. 
Importantly, the date was announced precipitously (on October 5) and would have been 
unexpected by all potential applicants. However, the data show the announcement resulted in an 
increase in applications between October 5 and October 9. Our preferred specifications use only 
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the data on enrollees up to the announcement date, but we estimate and report specifications 
including applications between October 5 and 9 as well.3  
The RD approach enjoys a distinct advantage over simple comparisons of those enrolled 
in the Core Plan with those on the waiting list. Since the cutoff date was imposed arbitrarily by 
the state (and was not an original feature of the program), it is reasonable to assume the 
individuals applying just before the announced cutoff date were very similar to those applying 
just after the cutoff date. The standard RD identification assumption applies, and in this context 
is interpreted as: there is no self-selection into application based on the knowledge the applicant 
will be on the waitlist rather than gain immediate insurance.  We implement our estimates using 
a local linear regression approach. We include robustness checks to various bandwidths as part 
of our analysis. The standard validity checks are included in the Appendix. 
The exact specification of our RD estimator is: 
(1) 𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝜃(𝑋𝑖 − 𝑥0) + 𝜏𝑊𝑖 + 𝛾(𝑋𝑖 − 𝑥0)𝑊𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖, 
with triangular kernel weights, where all observations outside the bandwidth h (more than ℎ 
away from 𝑥0) are discarded. Here, 𝑌𝑖 is the outcome under consideration, 𝑋𝑖 is the date of 
application, 𝑥0 is the cutoff date, 𝑊𝑖 is an indicator for whether or not the individual was 
enrolled in Medicaid (equals one if on the waitlist, zero if in Core), and 𝜖𝑖 is a random error term. 
The treatment effect of interest is 𝜏. The coefficients 𝜃 and 𝛾 allow the slope of the regression to 
differ on either side of the cutoff 𝑥0. 
A disadvantage of RD is that it does not use the entire samples of those on the Core Plan 
and on the waitlist, so lack of sample size could lead to power issues (though this concern does 
not appear to be an issue in our case) and limit our ability to conduct sub-analyses that further 
3 This is similar to the “donut-RD” estimate studied in Barreca, Lindo, and Waddell (2011) as a solution to 
heaping bias. 
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stratify by age or sex of the applicant. A second issue is that the announcement prior to the actual 
application cutoff date makes the identification less straightforward than might be desired. 
Specifically, we might be concerned that the announcement is a form of manipulation and affects 
waitlisted applicants in the post period in addition to those who enrolled during the few days 
between the announcement and the suspension of enrollment.  
For these reasons we complement our regression discontinuity design by including a 
second approach, the use of difference-in-differences and propensity score weighted difference-
in-differences methods. This design involves making the Core group and waiting list groups as 
comparable as possible based on observable characteristics, and it takes advantage of the panel 
nature of the earnings data. In contrast to the regression discontinuity analysis, propensity score 
weighting uses the entire samples of waitlisted and enrolled applicants. The most important 
difference with propensity score weighting relative to the discontinuity approach is the 
assumption required for identification: we must assume that conditional on observables included 
in the propensity score and an individual fixed effect, there was no selection on time-varying 
characteristics in the date of application (Smith and Todd 2005). 
A rich methodological literature establishes the conditions under which the use of 
propensity scores is appropriate in examining labor market outcomes (examples include Card 
and Sullivan [1988]; Deheija and Wahba [1999]; Deheija and Wahba [2002]; Heckman et al. 
[1996]; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd [1997]; Heckman and Smith [1999]; and Smith and Todd 
[2005]). A key finding from this body of work is that the underlying assumptions of propensity 
score methods are best met by including data on lagged labor market outcomes; indeed, lagged 
labor market measures have been found to be the single most important set of matching 
variables. We have access to historical UI data, which we use to construct such measures for the 
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study sample. Moreover, our data meet the other key conditions established in the 
aforementioned methodological literature: matched treatments and controls are drawn from the 
same geographical labor market and their respective labor market outcomes are measured in the 
same way (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997; Heckmanet al. 1996).4  
We implement both standard difference-in-differences with a variety of specifications, as 
well as propensity score matched versions of these models. In particular, we estimate the 
following model: 
(2) 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where Yit is an indicator for positive employment or total earnings for individual i in quarter t, 
Postit is an indicator for the earnings occurred in a quarter between Q3 2009 to Q4 2011, Coreit is 
an indicator the individual enrolled into the Core Plan, and Zi is a set of indicator variables for 
sex, age in months, and county of residence. 
To implement our propensity score adjustments, we estimate the propensity score using a 
probit with controls for quarterly employment for each quarter from Q1 2005 to Q2 2009, 
quarterly earnings in each quarter from Q1 2005 to Q2 2009, age, sex, and county of residence. 
We then construct a propensity score weight for each control observation (waitlisted applicants) 
using an Epanechnikov kernel weight (Leuven and Sianesi 2003). The results of the propensity 
score models and the balancing tests are reported in the appendix. 
Finally, we also embed our regression discontinuity framework within the propensity 
score approach and estimate these models restricting the sample to applications within 30 days of 
the cutoff date.  
4 Also of note is a recent German study that finds that propensity score models including lagged labor 
market measures and a set of demographic covariates similar to our own perform just as well as models augmented 
with additional person-level measures such as personality traits and motivation (Biewen et al. 2010).  
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RESULTS 
In this section, we present the results from the regression discontinuity analysis and those 
from the propensity score differences-in-differences analysis. Overall, both sets of analyses yield 
similar estimates despite being identified from different sets of assumptions. 
Probability of Employment 
Figure 1 illustrates the results of our local linear RD specifications for the employment 
outcome. All figures in the left column have the assignment variable, the exact date of 
application, on the x-axis and the outcome variable, average quarterly employment from Q4 
2009 to Q4 2011, on the y-axis. The figure in the first row includes all application days 30 days 
before and after October 9, 2009. Each observation is the average of the outcome for all 
applicants on that day. The lines are estimated local linear regression functions.  
The figure in the first column of the second row excludes the week prior to and after the 
cutoff day, starting from the left application date begins on September 4, 2009, and goes through 
October 4, 2009, and from the right application date begins October 15, 2009, and ends on 
November 15, 2009. The figure in the first column of the third row excludes just those days 
between the announcement and the cutoff, with applications from September 4, 2009, through 
October 4, 2009, and October 10, 2009, through November 10, 2009. 
Results of the estimation are summarized in Table 2. Most specifications show a 
statistically significant and relatively large drop in employment among Core Plan enrollees 
relative to waitlisted applicants, from 6.9 percentage points in the specification including all 
applications to 11.8 percentage points in the specification excluding one week around the cutoff 
and 5.9 percentage points in the specification excluding just the surge of applications between 
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the announcement and the cutoff date. The results in Table 2 are all reported at a bandwidth of 
20 days. While the 5.9 percentage point result is not statistically significant at the bandwidth in 
Table 2, it remains stable and becomes statistically significant at slightly higher bandwidths. 
Table 2 also includes specification checks adding all available covariates to the analysis (age, 
sex, employment in prior quarter, earnings in prior quarter). Results are not statistically different 
from the specifications without covariates.  
Figure 1 also includes bandwidth robustness illustrations for each set of results in the 
right column. In these, the x-axis is the bandwidth at which the specification was estimated, 
while the y-axis is the size of the estimate. The solid dark line represents the estimate itself, and 
the lighter dashed lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval for the estimate. After some 
variability at the smallest bandwidths (as is to be expected), estimates do not vary with the 
bandwidth used for estimation.  
In addition to quarterly measures of employment, Table 2 also includes specifications 
that aggregate the results to an indicator for ever being employed in 2010. Results and 
conclusions are very similar. 
We include standard validity checks in Appendix A. These include a density test (Figure 
A.1) placebo tests (Table A.3 and A.4), and covariate tests (Table A.1). All placebo and 
covariate tests are consistent with the regression discontinuity assumption with one exception: a 
small but statistically significant drop in age of applicants at the time of the cutoff of slightly 
over three years. However, including age as a covariate makes no difference in the results.  
Figure A.1 makes clear the increase in applications during the last week. In addition, 
Figure A.2 shows applications were allowed on weekends during the post period and not during 
the pre period, resulting in a Monday bump. Therefore, we also estimate models defined by 
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application week (Saturday–Friday) rather than day. We find no difference in the size or 
significance of results using these specifications. We also estimated all specifications controlling 
for the day of week of the application and found no differences in the results. These results are 
available upon request. 
Figure 2 plots quarterly employment rates for those enrolled in the Core Plan and those 
waitlisted from Q1 2005 to Q4 2011 for our different estimation samples. In the first set of plots, 
we include all observations, with the plot on the left unweighted and on the right propensity-
score reweighted.  In the second set of plots, we include only those observations who applied in 
either September or October 2009.   
Three things can be seen in Figure 2. First, Core Plan enrollees and waitlisted enrollees 
both suffered large declines in employment rates around Q3 2009, bottoming out in about Q1 
2010, suggesting that employment losses (and perhaps loss of employer-sponsored insurance 
coverage) led many to apply for the Core Plan Second, Core Plan enrollees tended to have higher 
employment rates in the quarters leading up to when enrollment into the plan opened in July 1, 
2009 than did waitlisted applicants, suggesting an adjustment based on observables and fixed 
unobservables needs to be conducted (as in Equation [3]). Third, waitlisted applicants had higher 
employment rates in the quarters following the cutoff date, suggesting a substantial employment 
disincentive effect of public insurance.  
The second two plots also show that the Core Plan enrollees and the waitlisted applicants 
who applied within one month of October 9 look relatively more similar in terms of their 
employment rates in the “pre” period, but in the “post” period the waitlisted applicants still show 
a substantially higher rate of employment. 
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Table 3 reports the results from our difference-in-differences models. The models based 
on Equation (2) can be interpreted as the change in average employment rates over the “post” 
period (Q4 2009 to Q4 2011) from the average employment rate in the “pre” period (Q1 2005 to 
Q2 2009) for those enrolled in the Core Plan relative to those waitlisted.  
The results indicate a relative decline in average employment rates of 5.9 percentage 
points for those with public insurance; these results are statistically significant and are robust to 
including controls for sex, age, and county of residence. When we restrict the sample to those 
who applied in September and October 2009, the estimated relative reduction in employment 
rates remains economically large—5.0 percentage points—and statistically significant.   
When we estimate the same models using our propensity score weighted sample, we find 
smaller estimates when the comparison is relative average employment rates between the “pre” 
and “post” periods (between 2.4 and 3.3 percentage points) that also are statistically significant.  
Earnings 
A negative earnings effect across the sample would be expected if wage rates remained 
the same and Medicaid enrollees were less likely to work. Figure 3 shows local linear regression 
discontinuity estimates of the effect of public insurance participation on quarterly earnings. The 
dependent variable is the average total quarterly wage and salary earnings from Q4 2009 to Q4 
2011. A summary of these results is included in the second row of Table 2. In these 
specifications, waitlist participants earn more than Medicaid enrollees; the results suggest a 
negative earnings effect of Medicaid of between $200 and $400 per quarter. Table 2 also 
includes an annual measure, total annual earnings in 2010. The results for annual earnings are 
very similar, suggesting an annual difference of $950–$1,460, depending on the specification. 
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Table 4 reports the results from our difference-in-differences models. The results from 
those who applied within 30 days indicate a relative decline in quarterly earnings of $200–$210 
for those with public insurance; these results are statistically significant and are robust to 
including controls for sex, age, and county of residence. When we include the full sample, the 
estimated relative difference in earnings is essentially zero (a statistically insignificant $16–$20).    
When we estimate the same models using our propensity score weighted sample, we find 
a slightly different pattern. In the full sample, the results suggest a positive earnings effect of 
around $70, while in the restricted sample they suggest a negative earnings effect of $120. These 
effects are statistically significant in both samples.  
Subgroups 
Table 5 reports the results of the regression discontinuity estimation for each of the date 
specifications and four splits of the sample: by sex, by age, by employment status prior to 
application, and by local unemployment rate. The table includes only the specification that 
excludes October 5–October 14 applications, and all results are reported at a bandwidth of 20 
days. 
Results are not particularly different for men and women, although effects are slightly 
larger for women. For age, however, there are clear and important differences in the employment 
effects. The effect is approximately twice as large as average for those between 35 and 55 years 
old, and more than three times as large as average for those over the age of 55. For those under 
35, effects are weakly negative (meaning that employment among Core Plan enrollees increased 
relative to those on the waitlist). This is consistent with an early retirement story for older 
workers who may have found it more difficult to obtain a new job.  
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Point estimates for those who were not employed in the second quarter of 2009 are 2.4 
percentage points larger than for those who were employed in the second quarter of 2009. The 
effect also is substantially larger for people living in counties with low rather than high 
unemployment rates (split at 10 percent, the 75th percentile unemployment rate weighted by 
individual).  In counties with unemployment rates of 10 percent or less, we find a reduction of 
employment of 6.8 percentage points of Core enrollees relative to waitlisted applicants.   By 
contrast, the estimate in counties with unemployment rates greater than 10 percent is very small 
(0.7 percentage points) and statistically insignificant.  
Self-Employment 
If some Core Plan participants are leaving wage and salary work for self-employment as 
a result of receiving public insurance, we would classify them as unemployed in our data. This 
would bias our results toward finding negative labor supply effects when none exist. As 
discussed earlier, results from the literature on the empirical relationship between health 
insurance portability and self-employment are mixed; however, given that it is a concern for us, 
we wanted to test for the possibility.  
We choose a sample of families with no children from the 2009–2011 ACS and compare 
those with incomes up to 200 percent of the federal poverty level to those with incomes from 
200–400 percent of the federal poverty level in Wisconsin and nationally, before and after the 
Wisconsin program implementation. While we find that the share of low-income self-employed 
Wisconsin residents eligible for public insurance was higher than in the national sample, we find 
no evidence of a difference in the shares relative to the national difference over time. We 
interpret these results as supportive of the hypothesis that changes in self-employment are not an 
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important determinant of changes in labor supply in our context. Full results from the triple 
difference estimation are available from the authors on request. 
CONCLUSION 
In this study, we examine the labor supply effects of publicly provided health insurance 
for low-income adults without dependent children. Our findings suggest that public insurance 
has a disincentive effect on the labor supply of low-income childless adults. The sizes of our 
estimated effects are large, ranging from 2.4 to 5.9 percentage points in the difference-in-
differences models and from 6.1 to 10.6 percentage points in the regression discontinuity models. 
Among a population in which only approximately half of enrollees had any positive earnings in 
the quarter prior to application, these are meaningful effects. Our evidence suggests that the net 
effect on earnings (including those who lost or changed jobs) was a reduction of $100–$300 per 
quarter.  
There are several caveats to our results. First, while we find negative employment effects 
using two different and complementary methods relying on different identifying assumptions and 
across a variety of specifications, our identification strategies are imperfect. For example, even 
when we adjust for observable differences between the Core Plan enrollees and the waitlisted 
applicants using the rich earnings and employment histories available in the UI data and 
employing difference-in-differences (which nets out any fixed unobserved differences), it does 
not preclude the existence of time-varying unobserved differences between the two samples. 
Moreover, we do find differences at the cutoff discontinuity in the age of the applicants between 
those waitlisted and those enrolled, which may indicate a violation of the strict RD identifying 
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assumptions. While these age differences are small and the estimated effects change little when 
we control for age in the RD models, the concern remains. 
Second, extrapolating from the Wisconsin Core Plan for childless adults to an expansion 
of Medicaid to childless adults may not be possible. The two programs differ in an important 
way: Medicaid is an entitlement while the Core Plan is not. Since new enrollment into the Core 
Plan was ended on October 9, 2009, any Core Plan member who left the plan (perhaps as a result 
of gaining health insurance through a new employer), would not be able to go back on the plan 
should he or she subsequently lose private insurance. This would not be the case with Medicaid; 
individuals would be free to exit and reenter the program as their eligibility changes. The fact 
that the Core Plan is not an entitlement could have had a “lock-in” effect on enrollees, 
exacerbating any employment disincentive relative to Medicaid. On the other hand, the waitlist 
itself may have provided a disincentive and waitlisted applicants had access to the Basic Plan. 
Although only a small percentage of them took up Basic, its existence would provide a work 
disincentive as well, and minimize the estimated employment disincentive of public insurance.  
Finally, as with other studies utilizing unemployment insurance records, we do not 
observe transitions into and out of self-employment. As we cannot differentiate between self-
employment and being out of the labor force, we could be overstating the association between 
public insurance eligibility and labor market attachment. Using auxiliary data from the ACS, we 
explore trends in self-employment among the target population of interest over the study period 
in order to deduce the potential magnitude and direction of any resulting bias from mislabeling. 
We find no evidence of important bias from our inability to identify self-employed members of 
our sample.  
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Our estimates of the labor supply disincentive of public insurance are slightly larger than 
those found by Baicker et al. (2013) in Oregon and substantially smaller than those found by 
Garthwaite et al. (2013) in Tennessee.  One possible explanation for the variation in estimates is 
an interaction between the programs and the business cycle. Our findings suggest that almost all 
of the labor supply response came from individuals living in counties with relatively low 
unemployment rates and that the labor supply response was greater among individuals who had 
been working in Q2 of 2009 (a little more than a year prior to their application to the Core plan). 
These findings suggest that part of the reason for the larger estimates in Garthwaite et al. (2013) 
and for the smaller estimates in Baicker et al. (2013) may be differing levels of economic activity 
across years and states. For example, the statewide unemployment rate was 5.6 percent in 
Tennessee in 2005, was 11.1 percent in Oregon in 2009, and was 8.5 percent in Wisconsin in 
2010.  
In light of these results, policymakers should be prepared for a reduction in labor supply 
among childless adults affected by the Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act. These 
labor supply effects may be sufficiently large to be noticeable economy wide. For example, if 
21.3 million additional adults gain Medicaid coverage following the ACA expansions, then 
approximately between 511,000 and 2.2 million fewer individuals will be employed as a result of 
the labor supply response (corresponding to our labor supply estimates ranging from 2.4 and 10.5 
percentage points). These aggregate numbers would be equivalent to roughly a 0.2 to 0.9 
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Table 1  Demographic Characteristics, Core Plan Enrollees vs. Waitlisted Applicants 
     
   
Core Plan enrollees Waitlisted applicants 
Ever applied 






Percent employed, Q209 0.43 0.48 
Average quarterly earnings, Q209 1,247.45 1,827.60 
Average employment, Q409-Q411 0.43 0.48 











Percent employed, Q209 0.45 0.48 
Average quarterly earnings, Q209 1,449.45 1,624.53 
Average employment, Q409-Q411 0.44 0.49 




     SOURCE: Authors' calculations from WI Administrative Data 




Table 2  Summary of Regression Discontinuity Results 
        Specification 
 All dates Excludes Oct 5 - Oct 14 Excludes Oct 5 - Oct 9 
Outcome No Covariates Covariates No Covariates Covariates No Covariates Covariates 
       Average employment rate, 
Q42009-Q42011 
0.0659*** 0.037** 0.055* 0.0524** 0.105*** 0.0763*** 
0.0194 0.0171 0.0292 0.0256 0.0235 0.0201 
       Average earnings, Q42009-
Q42011 
248.4** 148 314.2* 319.3** 445.8*** 367.3*** 
101.8 97.47 164 151.6 123 114.5 
       Ever employed, 2010 0.0752*** 0.0397* 0.0588 0.058* 0.0939*** 0.06** 
 0.0221 0.0224 0.0358 0.0332 0.0291 0.0265 
       
Total annual earnings, 2010 977** 584 1170* 1214** 1604*** 1338*** 
397.9 375.2 629.8 588.6 486 447.2 
       Number of observations 11,278 11,278 6,064 6,064 6,084 6,084 
       
NOTE: Table displays regression discontinuity estimates of effect of not getting the Core Plan, with robust standard error in italics. All results calculated at a bandwidth of 20 
days. Bandwidth robustness is included in Figure 1. Bandwidths defined as distance from October 9 in “All Dates” or distance from excluded interval in other specifications.  
*significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level. Covariates include age, sex, day of week of application, and earnings and employment 





Table 3  Summary of Difference-in-Differences Results, Employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
All application dates         
Post*Core Plan −0.059*** −0.059*** −0.059*** −0.059*** −0.024*** −0.024*** −0.024*** −0.024*** 
 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 
Demographics  X X   X X  
County fixed effects   X    X  
Individual fixed effects    X    X 
PS weighted     X X X X 
Number of observations 2,932,804 2,908,556 
Number of individuals 104,743 103,877 
         Within 30 days of Oct 9         
Post*Core Plan −0.050*** −0.050*** −0.051*** −0.050*** −0.033*** −0.032*** −0.033*** −0.033*** 
 0.0073 0.0073 0.0073 0.0073 0.0076 0.0076 0.0076 0.0076 
Demographics  X X   X X  
County fixed effects   X    X  
Individual fixed effects    X    X 
PS weighted     X X X X 
Number of observations 406,364 406,028 
Number of individuals 14,513 14,501 
         NOTE: The “pre” period includes Q1 2005 to Q2 2009 and the “post” period includes Q4 2009 to Q4 2011. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Demographic 




Table 4  Summary of Difference-in-Differences Results, Earnings 
         All Application Dates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Post*Core Plan 19.80 16.43 17.47 19.80 71.62*** 70.92*** 71.62*** 71.62*** 
 15.75 15.85 15.83 15.75 15.54 15.56 15.54 15.54 
Demographics  X X   X X  
County fixed effects   X    X  
Individual fixed effects    X    X 
PS weighted     X X X X 
Number of observations 2,932,804 2,908,556 
Number of individuals 104,743 103,877 
         Within 30 days of Oct 9         
Post*Core Plan −209.94*** −210.21*** −211.95*** −209.94*** −125.91** −122.95** −125.91** −125.91** 
 50.44 50.84 50.72 50.44 50.85 51.07 50.86 −125.91 
Demographics  X X   X X  
County fixed effects   X    X  
Individual fixed effects    X    X 
PS weighted     X X X X 
Number of observations 406,364 406,028 
Number of individuals 14,513 14,501 
         NOTE: The “pre” period includes Q1 2005 to Q2 2009 and the “post” period includes Q4 2009 to Q4 2011. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Demographic 
variables include sex, age, and county of residence. *significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 5  Regression Discontinuity Results, by Subsample 






    All (benchmark) 0.055* 314.2* 6,064 
 0.0292 164  
    Women 0.0689 419.7* 2,806 
 0.0449 254.8  
    Men 0.0519 248.8 3,258 
 0.0374 213.2  
  Age < 35 −0.0732* −268.3 2,541 
 0.042 226.6  
    Age 35-55 0.119** 666.3** 2,367 
 0.048 265.6  
    Age > 55 0.173** 815.7* 1,156 
 0.0733 471.2  
    Employed in Q2 2009 0.0468 433.3 2,725 
 0.0387 269.5  
    Unemployed in Q2 2009 0.0717** 262.7 3,339 
 0.0345 172.6  
    High-unemployment county (>10%) 0.00675 11.37 1,445 
0.0623 343.4  
    Low-unemployment county (<=10%) 0.0684** 399** 4,567 
0.0333 189.4  
    NOTE: Table displays regression discontinuity estimates of effect of not getting the Core Plan, with robust standard error in 
italics. All results calculated at bandwidth of 20 days, for specification excluding Oct. 5–Oct. 14. *significant at the 0.10 level; 
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Appendix Figure 2. Common Support Graphs for Propensity Score Analysis
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Table A.1  Covariate Tests      
  Bandwidth (days) 
  5 10 15 20 25 30 
All dates        
Age (Months) −41.57*** −54.84*** −59.33*** −54.48*** −51.83*** −49.55*** 
 15.59 11.98 8.777 7.65 6.942 6.309 
       Female −0.00883 −0.026 −0.0443 −0.0465* −0.0492** −0.0469** 
 0.049 0.0383 0.0282 0.0245 0.0221 0.02 
       Employment Q2 2009 0.0606 0.0514 0.0376 0.0287 0.0229 0.0211 
 0.0493 0.0386 0.0284 0.0247 0.0223 0.0202 
       Earnings Q2 2009 161.5 107 42.9 30.28 0.447 −2.446 
 220.7 175.7 135.8 120.5 111.1 101.7 
       Excludes Oct. 5 – Oct. 14      
Age (Months) −23.85 −34.32 −24.46* −23.05** −22.82** −24.11*** 
 43.16 21.54 14.22 11.64 9.78 8.55 
       Female −0.0574 −0.0365 −0.0355 −0.0378 −0.0286 −0.0209 
 0.137 0.0679 0.0448 0.0366 0.0306 0.0267 
       Employment Q2 2009 −0.0611 −0.0448 −0.0278 −0.0154 −0.0021 0.00845 
 0.136 0.0678 0.0448 0.0366 0.0306 0.0268 
       Earnings Q2 2009 561.5 185.3 82.67 49.87 75.51 106 
 749.3 361.5 241.4 201.1 168 145.9 
       Excludes Oct. 5 – Oct. 9      
Age (Months) −40.34 −55.01*** −49.48*** −48.18*** −46.33*** −43.06*** 
 28.3 16.31 10.93 9.336 8.366 7.56 
       Female 0.017 −0.0183 −0.0353 −0.0383 −0.044* −0.043* 
 0.0884 0.0517 0.0348 0.0297 0.0266 0.0239 
       Employment Q2 2009 0.0667 0.0591 0.0457 0.0412 0.039 0.0364 
 0.0883 0.0518 0.035 0.0298 0.0267 0.024 
       Earnings Q2 2009 −173.1 17.32 74.76 43.3 19.82 26.31 
 457.3 266.5 176.1 148.2 134.2 122.8 
       NOTE: Table displays regression discontinuity estimates of effect of not getting the Core Plan on pretreatment covariates, with 
robust standard error in italics. *significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table A.2  Placebo Tests for Alternate Cutoff Days 
  
Cutoff 
All dates t−14 t−12 t−10 t−8 t−6 t−4 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10 t+12 t+14 
Average employment, 
Q42009−Q42011 
−0.0189 −0.0248 −0.0267* −0.017 −0.0144 −0.00974 0.0535*** −0.0157 −0.037* −0.0382* −0.0328 −0.0142 
0.0161 0.0173 0.0151 0.0138 0.0136 0.0123 0.017 0.0199 0.0217 0.0227 0.0214 0.0208 
              Average earnings, 
Q42009−Q42011 
−72.88 −79.71 −102.9 17.28 −18.95 −49.18 298.9*** −0.414 −43.4 −27.95 −265.5* −119 
93.09 100.7 86.08 80.51 79.97 71.9 99.44 119 140.8 141 143.5 134.3 
             Observations 12,146 11,968 11,493 11,621 11,635 11,187 10,501 10,649 10,566 10,118 9,832 10,129 
             Excludes Oct. 5 – Oct. 14 
            Average employment, 
 Q42009–Q42011 
−0.00377 0.00617 −0.0106 −0.0306* −0.0221 −0.00978 0.0254 −0.00629 −0.00358 −0.0148 −0.0344 0.0127 
0.0172 0.0172 0.0165 0.0165 0.0175 0.016 0.0227 0.0218 0.0216 0.0216 0.0209 0.0214 
              Average earnings,  
Q42009–Q42011 
−157.4 −60.61 −117.5 −163.9* −83.88 −41.94 272.7* −152.1 −71.55 −159.9 −162.3 −86.99 
109.4 101.8 96.5 96.17 101.3 90.84 140.9 147.7 139.5 136.2 128.9 130.4 
             Observations 6,971 6,698 6,362 6,564 6,484 6,170 5,492 5,698 5,422 5,199 5,078 5,007 
             Excludes Oct. 5 – Oct. 9 
            Average employment,  
Q42009–Q42011 
−0.00606 0.00221 −0.0163 −0.0373** −0.0235 −0.00827 0.0157 −0.0467** −0.0524** −0.047** −0.0293 −0.00349 
0.0172 0.0172 0.0166 0.0165 0.0175 0.0161 0.0216 0.0218 0.0227 0.0232 0.0216 0.0213 
              Average earnings,  
Q42009–Q42011 
−158.4 −66.05 −125.5 −188.5** −96.56 −57.83 95.18 −173.7 −147.5 −111 −271.3* −74.27 
109.1 101.5 96.45 95.68 101.5 91.24 128.7 130.1 144.4 142.5 145.5 137.5 
             Observations 6,972 6,631 6,226 6,570 6,460 6,054 5,340 5,683 5,431 5,078 5,089 4,982 
              NOTE: Table displays regression discontinuity estimates of effect of not getting the Core Plan on pre−treatment covariates, with robust standard error in italics. *significant at the 
0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level. All estimates at bandwidth of 20 days. 
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Table A.3  Propensity Score Estimation Results 
 All applicants Applied within 30 Days of Oct 9 
Variable Estimate Standard error Estimate Standard error 
Employed Q12005 0.045 0.015 −0.054 0.042 
Employed Q22005 0.013 0.017 0.080 0.048 
Employed Q32005 0.046 0.016 −0.084 0.047 
Employed Q42005 0.031 0.016 0.023 0.047 
Employed Q12006 0.032 0.016 0.089 0.047 
Employed Q22006 0.019 0.016 −0.014 0.048 
Employed Q32006 0.071 0.016 0.086 0.047 
Employed Q42006 0.025 0.016 −0.011 0.046 
Employed Q12007 0.000 0.016 0.045 0.046 
Employed Q22007 0.046 0.016 0.024 0.046 
Employed Q32007 0.013 0.016 0.046 0.046 
Employed Q42007 0.000 0.016 −0.053 0.045 
Employed Q12008 0.024 0.016 −0.030 0.045 
Employed Q22008 0.012 0.016 −0.018 0.045 
Employed Q32008 0.031 0.015 −0.001 0.045 
Employed Q42008 0.010 0.015 0.044 0.044 
Employed Q12009 0.066 0.015 −0.010 0.044 
Employed Q22009 0.024 0.014 −0.042 0.039 
Earnings Q12005 0.005 0.003 0.011 0.009 
Earnings Q22005 −0.006 0.003 0.000 0.010 
Earnings Q32005 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.009 
Earnings Q42005 −0.007 0.003 −0.010 0.008 
Earnings Q12006 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.010 
Earnings Q22006 −0.004 0.003 0.001 0.010 
Earnings Q32006 −0.004 0.003 −0.010 0.009 
Earnings Q42006 −0.005 0.003 −0.001 0.008 
Earnings Q12007 0.001 0.003 −0.004 0.008 
Earnings Q22007 −0.005 0.003 −0.013 0.008 
Earnings Q32007 −0.001 0.003 0.007 0.008 
Earnings Q42007 −0.003 0.003 0.000 0.008 
Earnings Q12008 −0.004 0.003 −0.002 0.008 
Earnings Q22008 0.002 0.003 0.010 0.008 
Earnings Q32008 −0.013 0.003 −0.014 0.008 
Earnings Q42008 −0.008 0.003 −0.006 0.007 
Earnings Q12009 −0.015 0.003 −0.006 0.009 
Earnings Q22009 −0.059 0.003 0.000 0.007 
Age 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Female 0.090 0.008 0.025 0.024 
Constant −1.159 0.052 −0.121 0.142 
NOTE: Regression also includes dummy variables for county of residence.  Earnings in thousands of dollars. 
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Table A.4  Propensity Score Balancing Test       
 All applicants Applied within 30 Days of Oct 9 
Variable Waitlist Core %bias t Waitlist Core %bias t 
Employed Q12005 0.50 0.50 −0.60 −0.88 0.49 0.49 0.00 0.02 
Employed Q22005 0.53 0.53 −0.90 −1.28 0.53 0.53 0.10 0.06 
Employed Q32005 0.54 0.55 −0.90 −1.32 0.54 0.54 −0.20 −0.18 
Employed Q42005 0.54 0.54 −0.90 −1.31 0.54 0.53 0.30 0.21 
Employed Q12006 0.52 0.53 −1.00 −1.44 0.52 0.52 0.10 0.08 
Employed Q22006 0.55 0.56 −1.10 −1.62 0.55 0.56 −0.30 −0.22 
Employed Q32006 0.56 0.57 −1.20 −1.83 0.57 0.57 −0.50 −0.35 
Employed Q42006 0.56 0.56 −1.20 −1.82 0.56 0.56 −0.50 −0.40 
Employed Q12007 0.53 0.54 −1.00 −1.42 0.53 0.54 −0.50 −0.38 
Employed Q22007 0.56 0.56 −1.10 −1.57 0.56 0.56 −0.90 −0.67 
Employed Q32007 0.56 0.57 −1.20 −1.73 0.56 0.57 −1.00 −0.77 
Employed Q42007 0.55 0.56 −1.00 −1.40 0.55 0.56 −1.10 −0.80 
Employed Q12008 0.53 0.54 −1.10 −1.67 0.53 0.54 −1.20 −0.93 
Employed Q22008 0.55 0.55 −1.40 −2.01 0.55 0.56 −1.50 −1.13 
Employed Q32008 0.54 0.55 −1.40 −2.05 0.55 0.56 −1.70 −1.29 
Employed Q42008 0.52 0.52 −1.20 −1.77 0.52 0.53 −1.60 −1.18 
Employed Q12009 0.45 0.46 −1.00 −1.54 0.46 0.47 −1.50 −1.10 
Employed Q22009 0.43 0.44 −1.10 −1.62 0.44 0.45 −1.30 −0.95 
Earnings Q12005 1.92 1.97 −1.60 −2.43 1.97 1.96 0.30 0.24 
Earnings Q22005 2.13 2.18 −1.60 −2.44 2.18 2.18 0.00 0.03 
Earnings Q32005 2.29 2.35 −1.60 −2.46 2.36 2.36 0.00 0.00 
Earnings Q42005 2.22 2.28 −1.70 −2.57 2.30 2.28 0.40 0.30 
Earnings Q12006 2.07 2.14 −1.90 −2.98 2.16 2.16 0.00 0.01 
Earnings Q22006 2.21 2.27 −2.00 −3.11 2.32 2.33 −0.20 −0.15 
Earnings Q32006 2.27 2.34 −2.10 −3.26 2.38 2.40 −0.60 −0.46 
Earnings Q42006 2.26 2.33 −2.00 −3.16 2.37 2.39 −0.50 −0.41 
Earnings Q12007 2.08 2.15 −2.10 −3.32 2.18 2.21 −0.80 −0.61 
Earnings Q22007 2.20 2.28 −2.20 −3.47 2.32 2.36 −1.20 −0.89 
Earnings Q32007 2.23 2.31 −2.20 −3.51 2.37 2.41 −1.10 −0.84 
Earnings Q42007 2.21 2.29 −2.40 −3.72 2.33 2.37 −1.30 −0.98 
Earnings Q12008 1.99 2.07 −2.50 −4.07 2.12 2.17 −1.30 −0.99 
Earnings Q22008 2.06 2.15 −2.70 −4.28 2.23 2.27 −1.10 −0.87 
Earnings Q32008 2.02 2.11 −2.60 −4.32 2.19 2.25 −1.90 −1.44 
Earnings Q42008 1.85 1.94 −2.80 −4.57 1.99 2.05 −1.80 −1.45 
Earnings Q12009 1.37 1.44 −2.50 −4.23 1.52 1.55 −1.30 −1.04 
Earnings Q22009 1.24 1.32 −2.80 −4.95 1.44 1.48 −1.50 −1.12 
Age 521.72 521.31 0.30 0.38 505.17 499.11 3.80 2.80 
Female 0.49 0.49 −0.20 −0.25 0.47 0.46 0.80 0.61 
NOTE: Regressions also include 70 county of residence indicators; none has a statistically significant difference between waitlist 
and core or standardized bias greater than 10. Earnings in thousands of dollars. 
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